A Washington appellate court recently disqualified a county prosecutor’s entire office from participating in the re-trial of a murder case. The chief prosecutor had previously represented the defendant while in private practice. The case shines a light on government lawyers and imputed conflicts of interest.
Election win spells DQ
The county prosecuting attorney, Garth Dano, had worked closely as a “consulting attorney” with the murder defendant’s trial team, and communicated about strategy, the theory of the case, potential witnesses and jury selection. Dano also had appeared in court with the defendant. After the guilty verdict, and while the case was on appeal, Dano won election as county prosecuting attorney.
Dano’s office did not handle the defendant’s appeal, but after the conviction was reversed, two deputy prosecutors from his office were assigned to the case on remand. Dano recused himself, and had no part in the proceedings on remand, but the defendant moved to disqualify the county prosecuting attorney’s entire office. The trial court denied the motion, but a divided court of appeals reversed, applying Washington precedent and ethics rules to impute Dano’s personal disqualification to all the lawyers in the office.
“No screening” sufficient
“No amount of screening can be sufficient to fully wall off” Dano, the court of appeals held. In “unusual circumstances,” said the court, an elected prosecutor’s prior representation of a private client may be “attenuated,” and “brief,” such that no confidential communications were obtained. In that situation, personal disqualification and a screen could be sufficient without imputing the disqualification to the prosecutor’s whole office. Here, however, citing Washington Supreme Court precedent, Dano’s personal involvement in the same matter was too substantial to qualify for the exception, the court said.
Two Model Rules (and their state counterparts, which can vary) govern whether a conflict of interest that disqualifies a lawyer is imputed beyond that lawyer to others.
Model Rule 1.10 is the general rule for lawyers practicing together in a “firm,” and provides that a conflict based on a private lawyer’s prior representation at a different firm is imputed to the whole firm, except under specified conditions. (The conditions mainly involve screening, which is not recognized in all jurisdictions; see the ABA’s 2015 guide, here. And see Model Rule 1.0(c)‘s definition of “firm,” which includes in-house law departments).
In contrast, Model Rule 1.11 is the special imputation rule for current and former government lawyers. As comment  says, “Because of the special problems raised by imputation within a government agency,” the rule “does not impute” the conflicts of a government lawyer “to other associated government officers or employees, although ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers.”
You might think that the lack of an imputation rule for government lawyers would have allowed all the county prosecutors except Dano to participate in the remanded murder case, particularly since Dano had been screened from the other prosecutors. But not so. The court said that Washington’s then-version of Rule 1.11 simply meant that instead of a sweeping rule of imputation, as in Rule 1.10, government lawyer conflicts must be “assessed more narrowly, according to each lawyer’s individual circumstances.”
In Dano’s situation, the extensive access to privileged communications and work product of the defendant’s trial team spelled a conflict that would be imputed to the prosecutor’s entire office, requiring appointment of a special prosecutor, said the court.